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Abstract
This paper examines the optimal environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly
when pollution accumulates over time. Specifically, we assume quantity compe-
tition between several private firms and one partially privatized firm. The optimal
emission tax is shown to be independent of the weight the privatized firm puts on
social welfare. The optimal tax rule, the accumulated stock of pollution, firms’
production paths and profit streams are identical irrespective of the public firm’s
ownership status.
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Introduction
In recent years, the theoretical analysis of environmental policy under imperfect com-
petition has received large attention(see Requate , 2005, for an excellent survey). A
first strand of the literature focuses on the regulation of flow pollutants. In this con-
text, it has been shown that the optimal tax policy should be designed so as to balance
two effects of taxation. On the one hand, taxation increases social welfare by reduc-
ing polluting emissions and thus environmental damage. But, on the other hand, it
is harmful because it induces private firms to reduce their already suboptimal output
level. This trade-off was first disclosed by Buchanan (1969) and then formally studied
by Barnett (1980) and Misiolek (1980). They found that the optimal tax is less than
marginal external damage under monopolistic competition. Ebert (1991), Katsoulacos
and Xepapadeas (1996) and Lee (1999) proved that this result remains valid under
oligopoly. However, when additional externalities are taken into account (such as en-
dogenous entry, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas , 1995, or inter-firm externalities Yin ,
2003), the optimal tax rate may exceed marginal damage.
A second strand of the literature examines the regulation of stock pollutants. Since
pollution accumulation generates present as well as future damages, inter temporal ex-
ternalities must be taken into account in analysing the optimal environmental policy.
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A natural way to do this is to model the interaction between the regulator and the in-
dustry as a Stackelberg differential game with the regulator as the leader. Building
on the literature on efficiency-inducing taxation1, Benchekroun and Van Long (1998)
studied corrective taxation for polluting oligopolists. They showed that there exists a
time-independent tax rule that induces firms to follow the socially optimal production
path. The parameters of the optimal markovian tax rule depend on whether firms use
open-loop or closed-loop strategies. However, in both cases, the tax rule exhibits in-
tuitively appealing properties. First, since the tax rule is time independent, it satisfies
strong time-consistency requirements; i.e., subgame perfectness. Therefore, even if the
government is unable to commit to the entire time-path of taxation, the announced tax
rule is credible and cannot be manipulated by the firms. Second, the tax rate is increas-
ing in the pollution stock. Thus, it conforms with the idea that the marginal rate of
taxation should increase as the environmental problem becomes more stringent.
When the market is competitive enough, a pollution tax is always optimal. However,
as a result of the tradeoff between pollution (which generates environmental damages)
and market power (which reduces social welfare because of higher prices and lower
output), it may be optimal to subsidize production in the initial time period when there
are just a few firms and the stock of pollution is low. Furthermore, and quite surpris-
ingly, it may still be optimal to subsidize production when the laissez-faire output level
exceeds the socially optimal one at all points of time. The reason for this is simple. A
reduction in current industrial production induces positive intertemporal externalities
in the form of reduced future environmental damages. In order to capture these posi-
tive externalities, the corrective tax rule may consist initially in a subsidy that decreases
as industry output increases and turns into a tax when the stock of pollution becomes
large. In that case, the progressive nature of the corrective tax system provide firms
with an incentive to reduce their current outputs in order to keep the benefits of the
subsidy and postpone the coming of the tax.
Most analyses of the regulation of polluting firms have assumed private firms2. This
assumption ignores an important feature of a number of regulatory settings: the active
role of public and (partially) privatized firms as providers of goods and services. As
a result of the process of market liberalization in Western Europe (through which pri-
vate firms are allowed into markets that were previously monopolized by state-owned
enterprises) and of the transition process in the countries comprising the former So-
viet Union, Eastern Europe and Asia (of which privatizing state-owned enterprises is
an essential part), mixed market structures are becoming increasingly common. Ac-
tually, public firms compete with private firms in many highly polluting sectors such
as energy supply, transportation, iron and steel, chemicals and petrochemicals. They
are responsible for releasing large amounts of toxic compounds that accumulates in the
environment causing present as well as long-term environmental damages. Thus, the
issue of the environmental regulation of mixed markets deserves important considera-
tion.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse efficiency-inducing taxation when the market is
served by private and public (or partially privatized) providers. In this connection, we
would like to address two questions. First, we want to understand how the mixed mar-
ket structure affects the design of the optimal corrective tax. Second, we are interested
in the welfare effect of privatization when optimal taxation is used before and after
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privatization. With these purposes in mind, we introduce a partially privatized firm in
the model studied by Benchekroun and Van Long (1998). In line with the literature on
mixed oligopolies, we assume that firms with different ownership structures differ in
their aims. Since the privatized firm is partly privately owned and partly state-owned,
it cannot be assumed to be either exclusively profit oriented or exclusively welfare ori-
ented. Rather, its objective should reflect the different interests of its public and private
shareholders. Following Bös (1991) and Matsumura (1998) we describe the payoff
function of the privatized firm as a weighted average of social welfare and its own
profit3; i.e., f = (1−θ)w+θpi . In this formulation, the weight θ ∈ [0,1] measures the
extent of privatization.
We obtain an irrelevance result that might seem counter-intuitive at first glance. Namely,
we find that the optimal linear markovian tax rule which decentralizes the social opti-
mum as an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the differential oligopoly game is indepen-
dent of θ , the degree of privatization of the public firm. Thus, the optimal environmen-
tal policy tells us that technologically identical firms must be taxed the same whatever
their ownership status. Furthermore, this result is robust to changes in the informa-
tion structure of the differential oligopoly game considered4. Indeed, the optimal tax
rule remains independent of the extent of privatization if we assume that oligopolists
use closed-loop strategies. Turning to the welfare effects of privatization, we prove
that welfare is unchanged by privatization when the optimal tax rule is used. This re-
sult stems directly from the fact that the social optimum is independent of θ and thus
unique.
Our irrelevance result suggests that mixed oligopolies and private oligopolies should
not differ substantially in terms of economic and environmental performance if pol-
lution charge programs are correctly designed. This result seems consistent with ex-
perience and empirical evidence which indicate that the economic and environmental
consequences of privatization reforms are mixed and vary substantially across sectors
and countries5. Privatization conveys promises of increased productive efficiency and
more efficient use of resources, improved access to capital markets and greater invest-
ments in cleaner technologies, better management practices and easier access to mar-
kets for environmentally friendly goods and services. However, it also involves costs.
For example, the decrease in supply as a result of the exercise of increased market
power may result in a larger economic deadweight loss. In most cases analysed to date,
the quality of environmental regulations and commercial pressure have been playing a
preeminent role in the successes and failures of privatization reforms. Environmental
tax exemptions or lax environmental regulations have resulted in poor environmental
performance, whatever the ownership structure of the industry (e.g., Lovei and Gentry
, 2002).
This paper contributes to the literature on the interaction between privatization policy
and other policy instruments. Starting with White (1996) a number of irrelevance
results has been established in the context of static mixed oligopoly models. In the
linear-quadratic case, Poyago-Theotoky (2001) showed that the optimal output sub-
sidy is identical and profits, output and social welfare are also identical irrespective of
whether (i) a public firm moves simultaneously with n private firms or (ii) it acts as
a Stackelberg leader or (iii) all firms, public and private, behave as profit maximizers.
Myles (2002) extended this result to general inverse demand and cost functions and
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Sepahvand (2004) to mixed markets open to foreign competition. Claude and Hin-
driks (2006) proved that the irrelevance result suggested by White (1996) remains
valid when partial privatization is explicitly allowed. When several private firms with
profit objectives compete with one partially privatized firm maximizing a weighted av-
erage of social welfare and its own profit, the optimal subsidy is identical irrespective
of the weight the privatized firm puts on social welfare. The unicity of the social opti-
mum implies that profits, output levels and social welfare are also identical irrespective
of whether (i) the partially privatized firm moves simultaneously with n private firms
or (ii) it acts as a Stackelberg leader or (iii) all firms, public and private, behave as
profit maximizers. This paper shows that a similar irrelevance result obtains when
production generates polluting emissions which accumulate over time and the optimal
environmental tax rule is used to regulate pollution. To the best of our knowledge, it is
the first irrelevance result obtained in an explicitly dynamic regulatory setting.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the basic
model and characterizes the social optimum. Optimal corrective tax rules are derived
for open-loop and closed-loop mixed markets in sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section
5 concludes the paper.
1 The model
Consider a mixed market consisting of one public firm (indexed by 0) and n identical
private firms (indexed by 1,2, ...,n). Market competition takes place à la Cournot-Nash
over the continuous time period [0,∞[. In each period, firms face a downward sloping
inverse demand function p = P(Q) where Q ≡ ∑ni=0 qi with qi denoting the quantity
produced by firm i. Let the total cost function of firm i be Ci(qi) with Ci(0) = 0,
C′i(qi) > 0 and C′′i (qi) ≥ 0. We assume that technology is identical across private
firms; i.e., Ci(q) = C1(q),∀q > 0 and ∀i = 1,2, . . . ,n. However, we leave open the
possibility of a cost-asymmetry between public and private firms by assuming that
C0(q)≥C1(q), ∀q> 0. There is no capacity constraint and entry by additional firms is
supposed to be effectively blocked.
Production of good q generates polluting emissions, which accumulates over time in
the ambient environment. Without loss of generality, we assume that firm i’s level of
polluting emission is ei = qi. Furthermore, no pollution abatement technology is avail-
able so that firms can only reduce emissions by reducing output. Assuming a constant
rate of decay, the dynamics of the accumulated stock of pollution S is described by
dS(t)
dt
≡ S˙(t) = Q(t)−δS(t), S(0) = S0 ≥ 0, (1)
where the coefficient δ > 0 reflects the environment’s self-cleaning capacity and S0 is
the initial size of the pollution stock.
The welfare of society at time t depends on the current vector of production decisions
q(t) = (q0(t),q1(t), . . . ,qn(t)) and the current stock of pollution S(t). It is measured by
the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus less environmental damages. At time t
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social welfare is given by
w(t) =
q0(t)+∑ni=1 qi(t)∫
0
P(u)du−C0(q0(t))−
n
∑
i=1
Ci(qi(t))−D(S(t)), (2)
where the damage function D(.)measures the economic loss resulting from the current
stock of pollution S(t). It is assumed that the function D(S) satisfies the following re-
strictions: D(0) = 0, D′(0) = 0, and D′(S) > 0, D′′(S) > 0,∀S > 0. Furthermore, we
assume that P(0)>C′i(0),∀i= 0,1, . . . ,n.
In an ideal regulatory setting where the environmental regulator has direct control
over the production level of each firm, it can achieve the social optimum by choos-
ing time-paths of production for each firm so as to maximize social welfare. Let
r denote the social rate of discount. The optimal allocation of production q∗(t) =
(q∗0(t),q
∗
1(t), . . . ,q
∗
n(t)) is found by solving
max
q(t)≥0
W =
∫ ∞
0
w(t)e−rtdt, (3)
subject to the stock dynamics described by Equation (1).
In actual practice however the environmental regulator lacks the authority to enforce
the social optimum directly. Therefore, we assume that it seeks to implement the social
optimum indirectly by relying on fiscal policy. Following Benchekroun and Van Long
(1998), we suppose that the regulator uses linear Markov tax rules to regulate pollution.
Namely, we assume that each firm is charged a tax τi[S(t)] per unit of output, where
the unit tax depends only on the current pollution stock S(t).
The timing of the environmental regulation game is as follows. Prior to market com-
petition, the regulator announces the markovian tax scheme τ(S) = (τ0(S), τ1(S), . . . ,
τn(S)) that will be applicable to the firms. Then, firms engage in Cournot competition
at each subsequent instant of time t ∈ [0,∞[ taking as given the tax policy followed by
the regulator.
In the remainder of this section, we define firms’ objective functions, specify the infor-
mation structure of the dynamic oligopoly game and state the problem that the envi-
ronmental regulator must solve to characterize the optimal tax scheme.
The polluting oligopoly
Let us assume that the environmental regulator imposes a tax τi(S) on each unit of
pollution produced by firm i (i= 0,1,2, . . . ,n). Then, firm i’s instantaneous profit level
is
pii(t) = P[qi+Q−i(t)]qi−Ci[qi(t)]− τi[S(t)]qi(t), (4)
where Q−i(t) ≡ −qi(t)+∑ni=0 qi(t). In this paper we abstract from agency problems
between the regulator, private shareholders and the management of the public firm in
order to concentrate on the difference between private and public firms’ objectives. Pri-
vate firms are considered to be profit maximizers while the privatized firm is assumed
to behave differently. Following Bös (1991), we assume that the privatized firm’s ob-
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jective reflects the conflicting interests of its public and private shareholders. A natural
way to formalize this idea is to assume that the privatized firm’s instantaneous objective
is a weighted average of social welfare and its own profit
f0(t) = (1−θ)w(t)+θ pi0(t), (5)
where θ ∈ [0,1]. In this formulation, the weight (1−θ) describes the extent to which
the government is able to control the behavior of the public firm through the shares
that it has retained 6. If θ = 1 the privatized firm behaves as a private oligopolist;
i.e., it is exclusively profit oriented. If θ = 0 the privatized firm behaves as a welfare-
maximizing public firm and strictly adheres to the objective of the environmental regu-
lator. In the remainder of this paper θ is assumed to be exogenously given and readily
observable by the firms.
Firms long-term objectives are as follows. Each private firm i seeks to maximize its
aggregated profit, defined as the value Πi of its stream of discounted short-run profits:
Πi =
∫ ∞
0
pii(t)e−rtdt. (6)
By contrast, the privatized firm seeks to maximize the value F0 of its stream of dis-
counted short-run payoffs:
F0 =
∫ ∞
0
f0(t)e−rtdt. (7)
The specific sets of strategies that are available to the firms depend on the informa-
tion structure of the game. In this paper we restrict our attention to open-loop and
closed-loop information structures. Under an open-loop information structure, firms
are unable to observe the current state of the game. Consequently, they condition their
strategies only on time. Namely, each firm i (i = 1, . . . ,n) uses an open-loop strategy;
i.e., a decision rule of the form qi(t) = φi(t). By contrast, under a closed-loop infor-
mation structure, firms are able to observe the current state of the game and use this
information to revise their strategies at each point of time. Each firm i (i = 1, . . . ,n)
uses a closed-loop strategy; i.e., a decision rule of the form qi(t) = φi(S(t)). Whatever
the information structure considered, the relevant equilibrium concept for the analysis
of the dynamic oligopoly game is the Nash equilibrium. Let us recall that an open-loop
(closed-loop) Nash equilibrium is a profile of open-loop (closed-loop) strategies that
are mutual best responses.
The environmental regulator
At a prior stage the environmental regulator determines the system of linear Markov tax
rules τ(S) = (τ0(S), . . . ,τn(S)) to regulate pollution. Having determined firms’ optimal
behaviors in the oligopoly subgame, it selects the tax scheme τ(S) so as to maximize
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social welfare. Formally, the optimal tax scheme τˆe(S) is obtained by solving
max
τ(S)
W e =
∫ ∞
0
we(t)e−rtdt, (8)
s.t. S˙(t) = Q(t)−δS(t),S(0) = S0 ≥ 0,q(t)≥ 0. (9)
where the superscript e∈ {ol,cl} indicates whether variables are evaluated at the open-
loop or closed-loop Nash equilibrium of the underlying dynamic oligopoly game. Note
that taxes appear in expression (8) both as a revenue for the state and as an expenditure
for the firms. Thus, the direct effect of taxation on social welfare is zero. However,
taxation has an indirect effect on aggregated social welfare through its effect on firms’
equilibrium output levels.
2 The Social Optimum
Before analysing the environmental regulation game, it is useful to characterize the
social optimum where firms can be directly controlled by the regulator. This solution
provides a relevant benchmark against which the outcome of the environmental regula-
tion game will be evaluated. It can be obtained by solving the infinite-horizon optimal
control problem (3) with the stock of pollution S(t) as state variable and individual
output levels qi(t) as control variables. First we derive the necessary and sufficient
conditions for optimality. Second we characterize the steady state solution.
The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is defined as 7
Hr =
∫ Q
0
P(u)du−C0(q0)−
n
∑
i=1
Ci(qi)−D(S)+λr (Q−δS) (10)
where λr denotes the costate (or adjoint) variable associated with S˙. Assuming inte-
rior solutions, the maximum principle implies the following necessary and sufficient
optimality conditions
∂Hr
∂qi
= 0, −λr = P(Q)−C′i(qi), ∀i= 0, . . . ,n, (11)
along with the adjoint equation
λ˙r = λrr− ∂Hr∂S = λr(r+δ )+D
′(S), (12)
the dynamic process of pollution accumulation (1) and the transversality condition
lim
t→∞e
−rtλr(t)S(t) = 0. (13)
From the short-run optimality conditions (11), the costate variable λr is negative: it
can be interpreted as the shadow cost of the accumulated pollution stock. Furthermore,
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solving these conditions yields
C′i(qi) =C
′
j(q j), ∀i= 0,1, . . . ,n. (14)
Optimality requires that the aggregate output be produced at least cost. Therefore, op-
timality requires that marginal costs of the last unit of output be equal across firms.
Using (11) and (14) to eliminate the social shadow cost from (12), we obtain the fol-
lowing system of equations
P′(Q)Q˙−C′′i (qi)q˙i = (r+δ )[P(Q)−C′i(qi)]−D′(S), ∀i= 0,1, . . . ,n. (15)
We now look for a steady state solution to the dynamical system defined by (1) and (15),
i.e., a vector (Sˆ∞, qˆ∞0 , qˆ
∞
1 , . . . , qˆ
∞
n ) such that the pollution stock S and individual output
levels (q0,q1, . . . ,qn) do not change over time. The steady state solution is obtained by
setting S˙ = 0, and q˙i = 0,∀i = 0,1, . . . ,n in the system (1) and(15), summing over all
i and solving for (Sˆ∞, qˆ∞0 , qˆ
∞
1 , . . . , qˆ
∞
n ). There exists a unique optimal steady state stock
of pollution and industry output level and it is defined by:
(qˆ∞0 +
n
∑
i=1
qˆ∞i ) = Qˆ
∞ = δSˆ∞ (16)
where Sˆ∞ satisfies the following equation
P(δ Sˆ∞) =C′i(qˆ
∞
i )+
D′(Sˆ∞)
r+δ
(17)
and the respective share of each firm in the steady state industry output is given by the
conditionC′i(qˆ∞i ) =C′j(qˆ∞j ), ∀i, j(i 6= j) ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n}.
Condition (17) establishes that the socially optimum output should be chosen so that
marginal benefits equal marginal production costs plus the present value of marginal
external damages. It can be clearly seen from above that firms’ ownership structure is
immaterial from the point of view of the social planner. Indeed, social optimality re-
quires exclusively that allocative efficiency and cost efficiency conditions be satisfied.
The optimal control rule can be expressed as a function of the optimal level of accu-
mulated pollution S. The so-called feedback control rule Qˆ(S) determines the current
optimal aggregate level of production Q as a function of the current stock of pollution.
As an illustration, we consider the following linear-quadratic specification of the model
with linear inverse demand, quadratic damage cost and quadratic production costs
P(Q) = α−βQ, D(S) = γ
2
S2,C0(q0) =
c0
2
q20,Ci(qi) =
c1
2
q2i ,∀i 6= 0, (18)
where α , β , γ , c0 and c1 are positive constants. The steady-state is
Sˆ∞ =
α(r+δ )
γ+δ (r+δ )(β + c0c1/(nc0+ c1))
and Qˆ∞ = δ Sˆ∞. (19)
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The feedback control rule Qˆ(S) is
Qˆ(S) = Qˆ∞+(ρe+δ )[S− Sˆ∞] = (ρe+δ )S−ρeSˆ∞, (20)
where ρe is the negative root of the characteristic equation
ρ2− rρ− Jγ− rδ −δ 2 = 0, with J = 1
(β + c0c1/(c1+nc0))
. (21)
Finally, we have
qˆ0(S) =
c1
(nc0+ c1)
Qˆ(S), qˆi(S) =
c0
(nc0+ c1)
Qˆ(S), ∀i 6= 0. (22)
3 Open-loop mixed oligopoly
In this section we assume that firms are unable to revise their production paths once
they have made their choices; i.e., we assume an open-loop information structure. An
open-loop Nash equilibrium is a profile of open-loop strategies such that no firm wishes
to revise its strategy choice given the strategy choices of its rivals. From this definition,
it follows that each private firms i (i = 1, . . . ,n) chooses its time-path of production
qi(.) so as to solve (6) taking as given the production paths of all other players and
the tax rule τi(S). Similarly, the partially privatized firm chooses the time path of
production q0(.) which solves problem (5) taking as given the production paths of all
other players and the tax rule τ0(S). Under an open-loop information structure, current
value Hamiltonians for the firms are given by
Hi = pii+λi (qi+Q−i−δS) , ∀i= 1, . . . ,n, (23)
H0 = (1−θ)W +θpi0+λ0(q0+Q−0−δS). (24)
The open-loop Nash equilibrium requires that the optimality conditions of the (n+
1) optimal control problems hold simultaneously. Assuming interior solutions, the
necessary conditions for optimality are given by
∂Hi
∂qi
= P′(Q)qi+P(Q)−C′i(qi)− τi(S)+λi = 0, ∀i 6= 0, (25)
∂H0
∂q0
= P(Q)−C′0(q0)+λ0+θ
[−τ0(S)+q0P′(Q)]= 0, (26)
λ˙i = λir− ∂Hi∂S = λi(r+δ )+ τ
′
i (S)qi, ∀i 6= 0, (27)
λ˙0 = λ0r− ∂H0∂S = λ0(r+δ )+θτ
′
0(S)q0+(1−θ)D′(S), (28)
together with (1) and the (n+1) transversality conditions
lim
t→∞e
−rtλi(t)S(t) = 0, ∀i= 0,1, . . . ,n. (29)
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Using (25) to eliminate the shadow cost λi from (27) the following conditions obtain,
P′′Q˙ qi+P′q˙i+P′Q˙−C′′i q˙i− τ ′i S˙= (r+δ )[P′qi+P−C′i − τi]− τ ′iqi, (30)
∀i = 1, . . . ,n where P = P(Q), C′i = C′i(qi) and τi = τi(S). Similarly, from (26) and
(28), the following condition obtains
C′′0 q˙0−P′Q˙+θ
[
τ ′0S˙−P′′Q˙q0−P′q˙0
]
= (1−θ)D′+θτ ′0q0
+(r+δ )
[
C′0−P+θ
(
τ0−P′q0
)]
(31)
We proceed with the stability analysis of the system defined by (30) and (31) together
with (1). We look for a steady state solution where the stock of pollution S(.) and indi-
vidual output decisions q = (q0(.),q1(.), . . . ,qn(.)) remain constant over time. Steady
state conditions for an open-loop Nash equilibrium are obtained by setting Q˙ = 0 and
q˙0 = q˙1 = · · ·= q˙n = 0 in (30) and (31). It comes that the open-loop Nash equilibrium
steady state pollution stock S∞ol must satisfy the following system of (n+1) equations
(r+δ )(C′i −P) = (P′qi− τi)(r+δ )− τ ′iqi, ∀i= 1, . . . ,n, (32)
(r+δ )(C′0−P)+D′ = θ
[
(P′q0− τ0)(r+δ )− τ ′0q0+D′
]
. (33)
where arguments have been omitted for sake of brevity.
Now we are in a position to study how the environmental regulator can decentralize
the social optimum as an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game played by
the firms. The regulator designs the tax scheme τ(S) so that firms optimality condi-
tions match the socially optimal conditions. To begin with, we restrict our attention to
open-loop Nash equilibrium conditions. First we derive the condition that τi(S) must
satisfy in order to induce a given private firm i to behave in accordance with the social
optimum. By comparison of (30) with (15) the following condition obtains
τ ′i S˙−P′′Q˙qi−P′q˙i− (r+δ )(τi−P′qi)+D′− τ ′iqi = 0 (34)
where arguments have been omitted to save space. Second we derive the correspond-
ing condition for an optimal regulation of the partially privatized firm. Comparing
conditions (31) and (15) yields
τ ′0S˙−P′′Q˙q0−P′q˙0− (r+δ )
(
τ0−P′q0
)
+D′− τ ′0q0 = 0. (35)
Now, we proceed by considering steady state conditions for an open-loop Nash equi-
librium. From section 2, we know that (r+δ )(C′i−P(δ Sˆ∞))+D′(Sˆ∞) = 0. Therefore,
conditions (32) and (33) rewrites as
P(δ Sˆ∞) =C′i + τi(Sˆ
∞)+qi(Sˆ∞)
[
τ ′i (Sˆ∞)
(r+δ )
−P′(δ Sˆ∞)
]
, (36)
∀i= 0, . . . ,n. The profile of markovian tax rules τ(S) must satisfy conditions (34) and
(35) and τ(Sˆ∞) must satisfy the n+ 1 steady state conditions for an open-loop Nash
equilibrium (36). Clearly, these conditions are independent of θ . We thus obtain the
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irrelevance result stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When the environmental regulator uses efficiency inducing taxation in
order to regulate a polluting oligopoly, the optimal linear-Markov taxation scheme, the
time-path of pollution accumulation, firms’ time-paths of production and profit streams
are identical irrespective of whether i) all (n+1) firms behave as profit maximizers or
ii) a partially privatized firm competes in quantities with n private firms.
Remark 1 Let us observe the formal relationship that relates the long-run optimal
tax to the optimal corrective policy that would obtain in a static setting. Assuming
an unitary emission output ratio, environmental damage can be writen as a function
of the aggregate industry output so that social welfare becomes W =
∫ Q
0 P(u)d u−
∑ni=0Ci(qi)−D(Q) and the socially optimal allocation is now determined by
P(Q)−C′i(qi)−D′(Q) = 0, ∀i= 0,1, . . . ,n. (37)
Suppose that firms are charged a tax τi per unit of emissions so that firm i’s tax bill is
τiqi. Under Cournot competition, the firms’ first order conditions are then given by
P(Q)−C′0(q0)− (1−θ)D′(Q)+θ [−τ0+P′(Q)q0] = 0, (38)
P(Q)+P′(Q)qi−C′i(qi)− τi = 0, ∀i= 1,2, . . . ,n. (39)
Straightforward comparisons of the firms first-order conditions with the social optimum
reveal that the optimal tax is
τi = D′(Q)+P′(Q)qi, ∀i= 0,1, . . . ,n. (40)
A similar expression could have been derived from equation (36) by writing off the
actualisation parameter (r= 0), assuming that polluting emissions are instantaneously
assimilated by the environment (δ = 1) and replacing the tax rule τi(S) by a per unit
tax τi. It is important to note that proposition 1 not only shows that the optimal tax
rule is independent of θ at the steady state–as intuitions from the static model would
suggest–but also, and more surprisingly, all over the planning period.
The basic intuition for proposition 1 is simple. To begin with, we restrict our atten-
tion to the two limiting cases: the regulation of a private oligopoly and that of a pure
mixed oligopoly. The first is obtained by setting θ = 1 in the objective of the public
firm. In this case, the public firm is a profit maximizer and the problem boils down
to the regulation of a private polluting oligopoly. From Benchekroun and Van Long
(1998), we know that there exists an optimal tax rule which induces firms to follow the
socially optimal production path. The second is obtained by setting θ = 0. In this case,
the privatized firm maximizes aggregated social welfare. Corrective taxation does not
affect the output decision of the public firm directly; the tax only affects the behavior
of the public firm through its effect on private firms’ output levels. Now, suppose that
the regulator uses the tax rule obtained in the private oligopoly case to regulate the
pure mixed oligopoly. Then, private firms follow the optimal production path. Since
the public firm seeks to maximize social welfare, its best response to the behavior of
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private firms is also to follow the socially optimal production path.
Now let us consider intermediate cases; i.e., θ ∈]0,1[. In these cases, the partially pri-
vatized firm deviates from strict welfare maximization. However, its behavior is not
exclusively profit oriented. Suppose that the regulator uses the tax rule obtained in the
private oligopoly case to regulate the mixed market. Now, corrective taxation affects
the behavior of the public firm directly since it appears in its profits. Public and private
owners of the public firm have an common interest in following the socially optimal
production path. Indeed, it would be the policy chosen by the public shareholders if
they were the unique owners of the privatized firm and the choice of private share-
holders if they were the unique owners of the privatized firm. As an illustration, we
characterize the linear-Markov tax policy in two special cases: first, under the assump-
tion that all firms (public and private) use the same technology; and second, under the
linear-quadratic specification introduced in section 2.
Identical Firms
Consider the special case where all firms are identical in costs and technology so that
Ci(qi) = C(qi),∀i = 0,1, . . . ,n. Productive efficiency requires that all firms choose
identical output levels at each instant of time: qi(t) = q(t),∀i = 0,1, . . . ,n. Let us
assume at the outset that technologically identical firms face the same tax treatment;
i.e., τi(S) = τ(S),∀i= (0,1, . . . ,n). By summing equations (34) and (35), we get:
(n+1)τ ′S˙−P′′Q˙Q−P′Q− (r+δ )((n+1)τ−P′Q)+(n+1)D′− τ ′Q= 0 (41)
Substituting dSˆ(t)/dt for Qˆ(S)− δS and dQˆ(S)/dt for Qˆ′(S)[Qˆ(S)− δS] in equation
41 yields a first-order linear differential equation in τ which can be written as
τ(S)+A(S)τ ′(S) = B(S) (42)
where
A(S) =
((n+1)δS−nQ(S))τ ′(S)
(n+1)(r+δ )
(43)
B(S) = − D
′(S)
(r+δ )
− Q(S)
(n+1)
P′+
Q′(S)(Q(S)−δS)(P′+Q(S)P′′)
(n+1)(r+δ )
(44)
Summing the n+1 equations (36) yields the boundary condition
P(δ Sˆ∞) =C′+ τ(Sˆ∞)+
δ Sˆ∞
(n+1)
[
τ ′(Sˆ∞)
(r+δ )
−P′(δ Sˆ∞)
]
. (45)
The optimal tax rule τ(S) is obtained as the general solution of equation (42):
τ(S) = K exp
[∫ S
0
−A(u)du
]
+ τ p(S) (46)
where τ p(S) is a particular solution of (42) and K is a constant determined by (45).
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Linear-quadratic specification
Now, we proceed by solving for the optimal tax rule under the linear quadratic speci-
fication introduced in section 2 for which analytical solutions can be obtained. Under
linear demand, quadratic damage cost and quadratic production costs, the optimal tax-
ation scheme τ(S) = (η∗0 +σ
∗
0 S,η
∗
1 +σ
∗
1 S) is given by
σ∗0 =
γ(1+βJK)
(r+δ )+K(δ +ρe)−ρe ,η
∗
0 =
ρe [σ∗0 (K−1)+Kβ (r−ρe)] Sˆ∞
(r+δ )
(47)
σ∗1 =
γ(1+βJL)
(r+δ )+L(δ +ρe)−ρe ,η
∗
1 =
ρe [σ∗1 (L−1)+Lβ (r−ρe)] Sˆ∞
(r+δ )
(48)
where K = c1/(nc0+ c1), L = c0/(nc0+ c1) and J = 1/(β + c0K), decentralizes the
social optimum as an OLNE. Note that K = L if c0 = c1. Obviously, the optimal system
of tax rules requires that public and private firms be taxed the same if they use the same
technology. In this case, it equalizes partially privatized and private firms’ production.
4 Closed-loop mixed oligopoly
The analysis of subsection 3 has confined itself to oligopolistic situations in which
firms make use of open-loop strategies. By focusing exclusively on open-loop solution
concepts, it excludes strategic interactions between firms through the evolution of the
state variable over time and the associated adjustment in controls. We now proceed by
considering the broader class of closed-loop strategies in order to prove that our irrel-
evance result is not contingent upon assumptions regarding the informational structure
of the game. Since optimality conditions for private firms are independent of θ , we
may restrict our attention to the behavior of the partially privatized firm. Now, each
firm assumes that the strategies used by its competitors are a function of the accumu-
lated stock. Accordingly, firm 0 chooses the output path q∗0(t) which maximizes its
discounted payoff F0 subject to (1) and its current value Hamiltonian is
H0 = (1−θ)
[∫ q0+Q−0(S)
0
P(u)du−C0(q0)−
n
∑
i=1
Ci(φi(S))−D(S)
]
(49)
+θ [P(q0+Q−0(S))q0−C0(q0)− τ0(S)q0]+λ0 [q0+Q−0(S)−δS]
where Q−0(S) = ∑ni=1 φi(S). Assuming interior solutions, the necessary and sufficient
conditions are
λ0 = (C′0−P)+θ
[
τ0−q0P′
]
, (50)
λ˙0 = (1−θ)
[
n
∑
i=1
C′iφ
′
i +D
′−PQ′−0
]
+θq0
[
τ ′0−P′Q′−0
]
(51)
+λ0
[
(r+δ )−Q′−0
]
,
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and limt→∞ e−rtλ0(t)S(t) = 0, along with the dynamic process of pollution accumula-
tion (1). Assuming identical private firms and following the same steps as in section 3,
one obtains the following condition on τ∗0 (S):
Λ+Q′−0
(
τ0+(C′i −P)
)
= 0 (52)
where Λ= τ ′0S˙−P′′Q˙q0−P′q˙0− (r+δ )(τ0−P′q0)+D′− τ ′0q0 is the bracketed term
in (35). Again, we observe that this equation will be satisfied or not regardless of
the value of θ provided that it is different from zero. Following the same steps as in
section 3, it is straightforward to show that the corresponding steady state condition for
a closed-loop Nash equilibrium is independent of θ . The system of linear Markov tax
rules must satisfy a system of differential equations that is independent of θ and thus
the following proposition obtains:
Proposition 2 When the environmental regulator uses efficiency inducing taxation in
order to regulate a polluting oligopoly, the optimal linear-Markov taxation scheme, the
time-path of pollution accumulation, firms’ time-paths of production and profit streams
are identical irrespective of whether i) all (n+1) firms behave as profit maximizers or
ii) a partially privatized firm competes in quantities with n private firms.
As in section 4, the general characterization of the optimal markovian tax scheme for
the symmetric model and explicit solutions for the linear-quadratic model can be easily
derived8.
5 Conclusion
We considered efficiency-inducing taxation for a polluting mixed market in which a
partially privatized firm competes with private firms. The analysis of this paper pro-
vided some answers to hitherto neglected questions about the interaction between pri-
vatization and environmental taxation. Assuming that the partially privatized firmmax-
imizes a weighted average of social welfare and its own profit, we proved that the op-
timal corrective tax scheme is independent of the weight the privatized firm puts on
its own profit; i.e., the extent of privatization. This result tells us that technologically
identical privatized and private firms should be taxed the same even if they have differ-
ent incentives to produce. It was shown that this conclusion holds with respect to the
regulation of both open-loop and closed-loop polluting oligopolies.
Turning to the welfare effect of privatization, we proved that social welfare is un-
changed by privatization when the optimal pollution tax rule is used. Actually, our
analysis showed that the optimal tax rule guides polluting oligopolists to achieve the
socially optimal production path. Since the social optimum is unique and the opti-
mal tax rule is independent of the extent of privatization, the same level of aggregate
welfare is achieved irrespective of the ownership status of the public firm.
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Notes
1See, for example, Bergstrom et al. (1981); Karp and Livernois (1992, 1994)
2An exception is Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2002) who examined effluent taxation in a
mixed oligopoly with a welfare maximizing public firm and several private firms.
3See also Sasaki and Wen (2001); Lee and Hwang (2003); Matsumura and Kanda (2005);
Sun, Zhang and Li (2005).
4As will be shown this result also holds in a static setting.
5For a recent survey of empirical studies of privatization, see Megginson and Netter , 2001.
Environmental implications of privatisation are extensively reviewed in Lovei and Gentry , 2002.
6Alternatively, this objective function can be interpreted in terms of strategic delegation (See
for example Vickers (1985) and Fershtman and Judd (1987)). In this second interpretation, the
government delegates the control of the public firm to a private manager and θ measures the
extent of the delegation
7We will omit the time argument t whenever this does not cause confusion.
8Detailed derivations are available upon request from the authors.
Appendix A
Social optimum in the linear-quadratic model
In this appendix we characterize the social optimum under the linear quadratic specification (18).
As a first step, we solve for the steady state level of the pollution stock. From (16) and (17), the
steady state level of pollutant stock is
Sˆ∞ =
(nc0+ c1)α(r+δ )
δ [(r+δ )(β (nc0+ c1)+ c0c1)]+ γ(nc0+ c1)
, (53)
Qˆ∞ = δ Sˆ∞, qˆ∞0 =
c1
(nc0+ c1)
Qˆ∞, qˆ∞1 =
c0
(nc0+ c1)
Qˆ∞ (54)
We now proceed with the characterization of the unique trajectory which satisfies all necessary
conditions for optimality and ensures the convergence of S(t) to the steady state. Under the linear
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quadratic specification, short run conditions (11) become
λr =−α+βQ+ ciqi = 0, ∀i= {0,1}. (55)
From proposition (1), we have c0q0 = c1q1. Accordingly, we have q0 = (c1/c0)q1, q0 = c1nc0+c1Q
and qi = c0nc0+c1Q. Then, using this piece of information, the system (55) reduces to a unique
equation
Q=
1
β +(c0c1)/(nc0+ c1)
(λr+α) (56)
which can be differentiated with respect to time to get
Q˙=
1
β +(c0c1)/(nc0+ c1)
λ˙r. (57)
Using the adjoint equation (12), we rewrite as follows
Q˙=
1
β +(c0c1)/(nc0+ c1)
(λr(r+δ )+ γS) . (58)
Finally, substituting (53) into (58) gives
Q˙=
1
β +(c0c1)/(nc0+ c1)
(
−α+
(
β +
(c0c1)
(nc0+ c1)
)
(r+δ )Q+ γS
)
. (59)
Therefore, the Hamiltonian differential system reduces to a system of first order linear differen-
tial equations
S˙(t) = Q(t)−δS(t), (60)
Q˙(t) = Q(t)(r+δ )+ γJS(t)−αJ, (61)
which can be rewritten as y˙= Ay(t)+B where y(t) = (S(t),Q(t))′,
A=
( −δ 1
γJ (r+δ )
)
and B=
(
0
−αJ
)
. (62)
The characteristic equation of (61) is defined by det(ρI−A) = 0 where I is the identity matrix:
−(J γ)− rδ −δ 2− rρ+ρ2 = 0 (63)
The roots of the characteristic equation are
ρe =
r−
√
r2+4J γ+4rδ +4δ 2
2
, ρd =
r+
√
r2+4J γ+4rδ +4δ 2
2
(64)
Note that these two roots are real and of opposite sign, confirming a saddle point solution. The
positive root ρd corresponds to a diverging branch of the saddle point and is ruled out by the
transversality condition. It follows that there exists a unique solution of the Hamiltonian system
that converges to the saddle point for every initial stock of pollution S0. This solution corresponds
to the negative root ρe.
On the basis of ρe we can proceed to the characterization of equilibrium quantities. The optimal
evolution of S is
Sˆ(t) = (S0− Sˆ∞)eρet + Sˆ∞. (65)
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Since Q= S˙+δS, firms’ equilibrium strategies are
qˆ0(t) =
c1
(nc0+ c1)
[
(S0− Sˆ∞)(ρe+δ )eρet +δ Sˆ∞
]
, qˆ1(t) =
c0
c1
qˆ0(t) (66)
From (65) and (66) the socially optimal feedback control rule Qˆ(S) is
Qˆ(S) = Qˆ∞+(ρe+δ )[Sˆ− Sˆ∞] = (ρe+δ )Sˆ−ρeSˆ∞, (67)
and
qˆ0(S) =
c1
(nc0+ c1)
Qˆ(S), qˆ1(S) =
c0
(nc0+ c1)
Qˆ(S). (68)
Markovian taxation in the open-loop linear-quadratic model
In this appendix, we extend the analysis conducted in Appendix 1 and solve for the optimal tax
scheme τ(S) = (τ0(S),τ1(S), . . . ,τ1(S)) in the open-loop scenario. With this intention in mind,
we prove that differential equations (34) and (35) have solutions of the form τi(S)=ηi+σiS. Re-
placing dS/dt by Qˆ(S)−δS, dQˆ(S)/dt by Qˆ′(S)(Qˆ(S)−δS), qˆ1(S) by (c0/(nc0+c1))Qˆ(S) and
qˆ0(S) by (c1/(nc0+c1))Qˆ(S), we obtain two independent first order linear differential equations
τ0(S)+A0(S)τ ′0(S) = B0(S), (69)
τ1(S)+A1(S)τ ′1(S) = B1(S), (70)
where
A0(S) =
1
(r+δ )
[
δS+ Qˆ
(
c1
(nc0+ c1)
−1
)]
, (71)
B0(S) =
D′
(r+δ )
+
c1
(nc0+ c1)
[
P′Qˆ− 1
(r+δ )
(
P′′Qˆ+P′
)
Qˆ′(Qˆ−δS)
]
(72)
A1(S) =
1
(r+δ )
[
δS+ Qˆ
(
c0
(nc0+ c1)
−1
)]
, (73)
B1(S) =
D′
(r+δ )
+
c0
(nc0+ c1)
[
P′Qˆ− 1
(r+δ )
(
P′′Qˆ+P′
)
Qˆ′(Qˆ−δS)
]
(74)
Replacing τ0(S) by η0+σ0S, τ1(S) by η1+σ1S, and Qˆ(S) by expression (20) and collecting all
terms that have S as a common factor, equations (69) and (70) can be rewritten as
r0(σ0,η0)S+ s0(σ0,η0) = 0, (75)
r1(σ1,η1)S+ s1(σ1,η1) = 0. (76)
where
r0(σ0,η0) =
(r+δ )η0+ρe [σ0(1−K)+βK(ρe− r)] Sˆ∞
(r+δ )
(77)
r1(σ1,η1) =
(r+δ )η1+ρe [σ1(1−L)+βL(ρe− r)] Sˆ∞
(r+δ )
(78)
s0(σ0,η0) =
[−γ+σ0(r+δ −ρe)+K (σ0+β (r+δ −ρe))(δ +ρe)]S(t)
(r+δ )
(79)
s1(σ1,η1) =
[−γ+σ1(r+δ −ρe)+L(σ1+β (r+δ −ρe))(δ +ρe)]S(t)
(r+δ )
(80)
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Each of these equations must be satisfied for all S≥ 0. Accordingly, for the system of linear tax
rules τ(S) = (η∗0 +σ
∗
0 S,η
∗
1 +σ
∗
1 S, . . . ,η
∗
1 +σ
∗
1 S) to be a solution of (69-70), it must hold that
r0(σ∗0 ,η
∗
0 ) = 0, s0(σ∗0 ,η
∗
0 ) = 0, (81)
r1(σ∗1 ,η
∗
1 ) = 0, s1(σ∗1 ,η
∗
1 ) = 0. (82)
Solving this system we obtain the required expressions for τ∗0 (S) and τ
∗
1 (S).
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